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The seasonal demand for natural gas requires supply flexibility. 
This “swing” is now largely provided in northwestern Europe by 
indigenous production. Declining reserves will increase the 
dependency on imports from far-off sources, which are less flexible. 
Hence, flexibility must be provided by additional storage. We estimate 
that in 2030 between 10 (with no strategic storage) and 29 (with 10 
per cent strategic storage for imports from non-EU countries) billion 
cubic meter of working gas volume will be required, in addition to the 
existing 40 billion cubic meters. This estimation is based on 
production and consumption forecasts for natural gas and observations 
of the relationship between the supply and demand of gas and the 
supply and demand of flexibility in the period 1995-2005. We provide 
different scenarios to check for the robustness of our results. We 
discuss the impact of third-party access to storage facilities on 
incentives to close the storage gap, as well as policy implications of 
strategic storage obligations. 
Keywords: Seasonal swing, strategic storage obligations, third-
party access,  
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1.  Introduction 
Natural gas is the strongest growing primary energy source in western Europe. 
According to the EU Commission, the consumption of natural gas increased on 
average by 3.4 per cent per annum between 1995 and 2005 in the EU-15 member 
states. Total primary energy consumption grew only at 1.2 per cent in the same 
period (EU Commission 2006, p. 76). While growth is projected to slow down, 
natural gas is forecasted to exhibit above average growth (with a compound annual 
growth [CAGR] of 0.6 per cent, compared to 0.2 per cent CAGR for the total 
primary energy consumption for 2005—2030).
1 
Since natural gas is largely used for heating, consumption is subject to a 
significant seasonal swing. In northwestern Europe
2 (NWE) approximately two-
thirds of the gas is consumed during the winter (October till March). Residentials 
consume about 90 per cent of their overall gas during the winter period.
3 For local 
gas providers, it is therefore not uncommon to have daily peaks in gas delivery in 
the winter amounting to more than ten times the delivery on a summer day. This 
strong seasonal consumption profile requires flexibility on the supply side. In NWE 
there are two main sources of flexibility: production and storage. The significant 
indigenous production in the region (in particular of the highly flexible Dutch 
Groningen gas field) provides considerable “swing”. Imports from more remote 
sources (like Russia) show a far flatter profile due to the high capital cost of the 
pipelines, which call for a constant high utilization. 
However, since the flexible indigenous production will decrease and has to be 
replaced by less flexible imports, more flexibility has to come from the second 
source, namely gas storage facilities. Our research question is: How much (new) 
storage is required to deal with the foreseeable change in the supply structure of 
NWE? 
To answer this, we propose a simple top-down analysis. We start from the 
forecast for the overall gas consumption in the countries of NWE until 2030. Based 
on historical ratios of gas consumption and the seasonal swing in the 1995-2004 
period, we forecast the demand for seasonal swing in the year 2030. Employing a 
similar approach, we take an existing prediction for the supply structure of natural 
gas for NWE in 2030 from EUGAS, a forecast model of the German EWI (Institute 
for Energy Economics, see Bothe and Seeliger 2005). Again, based on historical 
observations of the ability to supply swing from production for each country of 
origin, we approximate the possible swing supply from production and imports in 
2030. 
Comparing these figures to our base year 2005, we project the additional 
demand for storage to be 21.3 BCM by 2030. If there was no excess capacity in 
                                                           
1 Only renewables are projected to grow faster, at 3.2 per cent p.a, but from a far lower 
level. 
2 Northwestern Europe, in the definition of the paper, comprises Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. 
3 This is well documented for Germany; see “AK Energiebilanzen, Endenergieverbrauch in 
Deutschland 2004“, Energie Spezial, 27.4.2006, Table 3 and 4.   4
storage WGV by 2005, this would be identical to necessary additions to the 
existing installed volume of WGV. However, data on the actual usage of storages 
indicate some idle capacity by 2005. Assuming that 20 per cent of the WGV was 
not used by 2005 (which probably biases forecasts towards an underestimation of 
the storage gap), the required additional storage volume amounts to 10.2 BCM by 
2030. This is equal to about 25 per cent of the currently installed WGV of 40.5 
BCM. 
Supply interruptions on long-distance transport routes – for technical reasons or 
for political reasons – are a risk for the security-of-supply, which, due to the 
changing structure of gas supply of NWE, will become more pronounced. If NWE 
countries wanted to hold strategic stocks of gas (similar to oil) in the order of 5 per 
cent (10 per cent) of Non-EU imports, this gap would increase to 19.6 BCM (29 
BCM), since strategic stock blocks capacities for the usual operational supply of 
flexibility. 
Closing the gap seems less to be a technological problem than a problem of 
providing the right framework for investments in storage. In a functioning market 
for flexibility, an “operational” storage gap of 10.2 BCM can probably be closed 
by market forces. Increasing shortage increases prices and thereby investment 
incentives. However, regulation of storage – which is often necessary to open the 
overall gas market to new entrants – tends to reduce investment incentives. 
Therefore, European legislation allows for exemptions from regulation for new 
investments. Our analysis tends to support the view that such exemptions are 
indeed sensible. 
It is more difficult to design the right framework for supplying the far larger 
amount of storage required for strategic security of supply considerations. Most 
likely, this will lead to a split of the market into a regulated part (for covering 
security of supply obligations) and an unregulated part (for usual operational usage 
of storage). To account the interdependencies between the two market segments 
will be a major task for the future. 
Most closely related to our work is a working paper by the Clingendael 
International Energy Programme (2006). It reports results on a similar forecast for 
future storage needs for the whole of Europe.
4 In a recent book, Grewe (2005) 
studies the German market for gas storage in detail. In a report to the Dutch 
regulator DTe, the consulting firm Frontier Economics (2005) analyzed the market 
structure in the Dutch market for flexibility. Cornot-Gandolphe (2003) examines 
the European market for flexibility. That new storage facilities will be required due 
to increases in the gas demand has also been noted by the UN/ECE (2000) in a 
forecast up to 2010. In its energy outlook, the IEA (2005, I.18) stresses the change 
in the supply structure that is to be expected, but it does not elaborate on the 
consequences for the market for flexibility. In a large study on the security of 
supply (IEA 2004), the IEA provides a valuable overview of how OECD countries 
currently use storages as strategic stock. We want to contribute to this literature by 
                                                           
4 An additional volume of 2 BCM p.a. is mentioned. However, the time horizon for this 
forecast is not quite clear. In addition, due to the different regional focus, the figures are not 
comparable to ours.   5
(i) using a transparent forecasting method, (ii) relying on a precise import split for 
gas with respect to the country of origin, (iii) checking for the robustness of the 
results using scenarios, and (iv) using up-to-date, publicly available data.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes 
technical details and the status quo in the provision of flexibility in NWE. Section 
three explains how we derive our forecasts. Section four presents the results and 
analyses them with the help of different scenarios. Section five discusses additional 
factors not covered in the quantitative analysis. Section six concludes and proposes 
policy implications. 
2.  Status quo of flexibility provision in NWE 
The focus of our analysis is NWE, which accounted for 71 per cent of the final 
gas consumption in western Europe (EU 15 plus Switzerland) in 2005 (see footnote 
2 for the regional definition of NWE). The countries of this region share important 
characteristics. First, and most importantly, all these countries use large amounts of 
natural gas from the North Sea. It is precisely the depletion of North Sea gas fields 
which is triggering the change in the supply structure we want to examine. Second, 
and related, the major gas flows, and, therefore the infrastructure, connect these 
countries in North-South flows from the North Sea. Third, most countries have 
significant indigenous production. The flexibility from their own production has 
made gas storage less important.
5 
The gas demand of these mature gas markets is heavily driven by the heat 
market. Thus, the consumption profile reflects the strong usage for heating 
purposes in winter compared to the summer consumption, which, for its part, is 
mainly due to industrial customers and power plants. Although there is additional, 
more short-term, variability in the demand structure (between night and day, 
working day versus the weekend), we will base our analysis on the seasonal swing. 
Figure 1 provides data of the annual consumption profile of the UK and Germany, 
the two largest gas consuming countries in NWE. Both countries use 
approximately two-thirds of their gas in the winter months (October to March). 
 
                                                           
5 Norway produces a large amount of gas from the North Sea, but has virtually no gas 
consumption of its own. Eastern and southeastern European countries (including Austria) 
always used to be heavily dependent on Russian gas and had to provide flexibility through 
storage. Thus, there is no qualitative change to be expected. Italy – the only major western 
European gas consumer not covered in our analysis – and Spain get the majority of their 
gas supply from Africa.   6
Figure 1: Load Profile 2004 of UK and Germany 
Source: International Energy Agency 'Natural Gas Balance' 
For the purposes of the paper, we want to define “swing” simply as the 
difference between the sum of the winter values and the sum of the summer values 
of a variable, i.e. “swing demand” equals the sum of the winter consumption 
(defined as the months October to March) minus the sum of the summer 
consumption. The “swing ratio” is the ratio of the swing divided by the total 
consumption. For the UK and Germany, this figure was 0.25 and 0.33, 
respectively, implying that the “above-average” demand in winter was 25 and 33 
per cent of the annual demand, respectively. 
We take the swing demand as given, which essentially implies an assumption of 
price inelastic demand, which is also inflexible with regard to timing. Note that 
peak load pricing, which tries to shift demand from “peak” times to “off-peak”, is 
unlikely to shift gas demand. The reason for the seasonal swing is the heating 
demand in winter. Obviously, households cannot substitute heating in the winter 
with heating in the summer (like they can do by, e.g., substituting telephone calls in 
peak hours with off-peak calls). Also, industrial demand is unlikely to exhibit the 
flexibility required to substitute production in the winter with production in the 
summer. 
There are essentially three ways to meet the seasonal swing demand: first, by 
flexible gas production, i.e. by producing less in the summer than in the winter; 
second, by flexibility in import contracts; third, by storing gas in the summer and 
releasing it in the winter.
6 
Each alternative is costly. The production of natural gas exhibits strong 
economies of scale. The fixed and sunk costs of exploration and the installation of 
production facilities are huge, while the variable costs of production are small. 
Thus, using production facilities to their maximum capacity all the time is the most 
cost-effective method of energy production. Also, production has to be 
differentiated into pure gas production and associated gas production; in the latter, 
                                                           
6 To a limited extent, “line pack” can also be used, i.e. storage in the pipeline system, and 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, this as well as surface storage is much smaller, and 

















































the production schedule is driven by the oil production. In addition, many fields 
have technical limitations to the variation in output. 
A similar logic applies to transportation. Long pipelines, e.g., from Russia to 
France, require large investments and thus cause high capital costs. Thus, leaving 
capacity idle is costly, and these costs increase with the distance of transportation. 
Large underground storage facilities are suitable to provide enough volume 
(known as “working gas volume”, WGV) to balance seasonal swing; they also 
require significant investments. 
Figure 2 shows how, in the 1995-2005
7 period, the seasonal swing was met by 
the three different forms of supply flexibility in NWE. NWE is treated as an 
aggregate such that exports and imports within the region cancel out. Storage and 
swing from production are the main suppliers of flexibility. 



















Source: International Energy Agency 'Natural Gas Balance'; own calculations 
 
 
The data show a clear trend: as a swing supplier, storage became increasingly 
more important than in indigenous production. While (for a three year average) in 
the beginning of the period, production accounted for 52 per cent of the swing 
supply, its contribution declined to 39 per cent at the end. Since the share of import 
swing remained stable at about 20 per cent, the contribution of storage rose from 
about 30 per cent to more than 40 per cent. 
The larest part of swing from indigenous production stems from the Netherlands 
(in 2004/05: approximately 64 per cent), in particular from one large gas field in 
                                                           
7 For these and all other calculations, we use a usual “gas year”, i.e. 1995/96 accounts for 
the time from October 1995 to September 1996.   8
Groningen, which is very well suited to provide flexibility (in 2003 Groningen 
accounted for 48 per cent of all production swing in NWE).
8 
While production swing is concentrated in the Netherlands, most storage 
facilities are located in Germany. According to the International Gas Union (IGU 
2006), in 2005 the overall WGV in NWE was 40.5 BCM, with 19.2 BCM located 
in Germany. Storage capacities were increased in Germany by about 80 per cent 
between 1995 and 2005. This increase implies that the maximum storage WGV in 
NWE is now well above the level of storage currently used. For example, even in 
the relatively cold winter 2005/06, with low temperatures at the end of the heating 
period, only 58 per cent of the storage capacities were actually used. This is, 
however, not necessarily a sign of excess capacities, since gas companies hold 
reserves (buffer) for extremely cold winters. 
A series of additional storage facilities are planned within NWE. The total 
amount of planned storage is approximately 6 BCM WGV, equivalent to 15 per 
cent of existing volume (IGU 2006).
9 It is not certain whether all of these projects 
will be finalized and will reach the planned size. Usually it is not clear in the 
beginning how much WGV a specific site will actually store. It is not uncommon 
for storage operators to apply for the absolute maximum storage size in the 
planning period in order to avoid having to apply for additional authorization in 
case a site turns out to be more promising than expected. 
Furthermore, storage projects are long-term and can take up to ten years to 
complete. Thus, some of the existing “excess capacities” might be provisions for 
the expected additional need for flexible storage in the future. In the next section 
we propose a model to approximate whether the operational and planned storage 
facilities are sufficient for this purpose. 
3.  Model 
We use a simple top-down approach to forecast the demand for flexibility in the 
year 2030. We take gas demand and gas supply as exogenously given and derive 
the resulting swing demand and swing supply from production and imports by 
extrapolation from the current structure. The details of the assumptions and results 
can be found in the appendix. The results of the model are not equilibrium results, 
since we do not look at prices. The gas market outcome would be a market 
equilibrium only if one assumes a perfectly competitive supply of gas and fully 
price inelastic demand. Figure 3 provides a schematic overview of our approach. 
 
                                                           
8 This figure is calculated using the Dutch regulator’s data, cited by Frontier Economics 
(2005, 28) and the IEA data “Natural Gas Balance” for 2003. 
9 There are substantial differences between the data of the IGU and the IEA concerning the 
operational and planned WGV. While the IGU figures are higher for the installed volume, 
the IEA reports far higher figures for planned facilities, namely 18 BCM in 2004 (IEA 
Natural Gas Information, Edition 2005). We rely on the IGU data since they are more 
recent.   9
Figure 3: Approach for extrapolation 
 
We rely on the demand forecast by the EU for the gas demand of each of the 
member countries (see Figure 1). The overall growth in the region is relatively low, 
with an annual growth rate of only 0.4 per cent. 
To derive the swing that results from this gas demand, we apply the maximum 
“swing ratio” observed over the period 1995/6-2004/5. This provides us – 
assuming no structural changes in the demand – with a lower bound for the demand 
for flexibility that has to be met. It is a lower bound since suppliers probably want 
to be able to meet the peaks, which – in particular in very hard winters – might well 
exceed the ratios observed from 1995/6-2004/5. 
Restricting attention to observations from 1995/6-2004/5 makes sense since the 
gas industry is relatively young and has been growing very fast in the last twenty to 
thirty years. Thus, only the structures in the last 10 years might be sufficiently 
mature to serve as a basis for extrapolation. Furthermore, this period also includes 
the winter of 1995/1996, which was a rather cold winter in NWE (i.e. in Germany 
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Figure 4: Temperature Data for NWE (average winter temperature, C°) 
 
    Coldest Winter in …. years 
 
Winter 
1995/96    10 20 30 50  100 
Belgium 3.9    3.9 3.6 3.5 1.9 1.9 
Denmark 0.9    0.9 0.8 0.8 -0.2  -1.5 
France 6.6    6.1 5.3 5.3 3.9 3.9 
Germany 1.5    1.5  1.5  1.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Netherlands 3.3   3.3  3.3  3.3 1.8 1.8 
Switzerland 0.6   0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -2.1 -2.1 
UK 5.3    4.8 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.7 
Source: Tim Mitchell, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Data Set 
TYN CY 1.1, downloadable http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/cty/obs/ 
In the past, gas suppliers held significant buffers on top of that. Often they 
attempted to be prepared for the hardest winter in the last fifty years. At least under 
current legislation, they are often obliged to do so, e.g., in France and Belgium.
10 
Instead of using average temperatures, the industry refers to the concept of “degree 
days”, which tries to provide a better proxy for the influence of the weather on the 
heating behavior. Definitions, however, differ between countries, thus, as a short 
cut, we use the maximum value of the last ten. 
On the supply side, we borrow estimations from Bothe and Seeliger (2005).
11 
They use the EUGAS model, which assumes a least cost provision of gas. They 
take the IEA consumption forecast as a given exogenous parameter, and calculate 
how this demand – until 2030 – can be met for each European country by the 
lowest cost producer (taking into account some policy and diversification motives 
of importing countries). This essentially means that a competitive supply of natural 
gas and a price inelastic demand for natural gas are assumed. 
This provides us with a regional split in the country of origin for the natural gas 
supply in 2030. This is important since different countries exhibit different abilities 
to supply swing from their production. Again, we take the swing ratios from the 
observations in 1995/6-2004/5, use the average and just multiply the result by the 
supply figures from Bothe and Seeliger. This provides an upper bound for the 
supply of swing from production and imports. True swing supply will probably be 
lower since (i) the depleting fields in NWE will be less able to supply swing, and 
(ii) imports, in particular from Russia, will come from more distant fields, also 
reducing the swing capability. 
                                                           
10 IEA (2004) Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets, p. 345-346. Other countries, like 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK, have similar obligations. 
11 We are particularly grateful to them for providing us with a regional split from their 
model for our NWE definition for the country of origin of the natural gas supply in 2030. 
Thus, the figures used in our paper differ from (but are consistent with) the aggregate 
figures Bothe and Seeliger report in their Figure 3, p. 4.   11
We finally compare the swing demand to the swing supply from production and 
consumption to derive the additional demand for storage.
12 This is just the 
difference between the calculated values for the future compared to our base year 
2005. 
4.  Results 
We present four kinds of results. We start by providing the extrapolation for the 
additional storage demand, as described in Section three. We then discuss 
reasonable assumptions on structural changes to derive a more realistic forecast. In 
a third step, we add additional considerations regarding the security of supply. 
Finally, we discuss whether the assumption that all additional storage demand 
needs to be covered by additional storage is warranted or whether some of it might 
be met by capacities already installed but currently left idle. 
Extrapolation 
With an aggregated annual growth rate of 0.4 per cent, the gas demand will 
amount to 3.393 TWh in 2030. Using the (maximum) swing ratio from the period 
1995-2005, this translates into a swing demand of 1.233 TWh (see Figure 5). 
 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (3) x (4)
unit TWh CAGR (%) TWh Ratio TWh
NWE 3.393 0,4% 3.733 1233,0
Belgium 166 0,6% 192 0,31 59,8
Denmark 60 0,8% 74 0,31 22,9
France 524 0,3% 563 0,46 258,7
Germany 1.029 0,4% 1.139 0,35 404,1
Netherlands 465 0,1% 480 0,31 150,3
Switzerland 35 1,0% 46 0,44 20,1
UK 1.114 0,4% 1.240 0,26 317,0
Source: EU, Energy and Transport, Trends to 2030; IEA Natural Gas Balances; 
own calculations. 
 
In accord with the values from Bothe and Seeliger (2005), by the year 2030, it 
will only be possible to meet approximately 19 per cent of the gas demand by 
indigenous production (while in 2005 it was possible to meet 56 per cent of the 
demand). The majority now comes from more distant sources, mainly from Russia 
and other former CIS: In 2030, 35 per cent will come from there (19 per cent in 
2005), 17 per cent will come from Africa and the Caribbean (8 per cent in 2005), 
                                                           
12 Already planned additional storage projects are deducted, since they are equivalent to a 
“negative swing demand”. We assume that all projects known in 2006 will be fully on 
stream by 2015.   12
and 5 per cent from the Middle East (0 per cent in 2005). The change in the country 
of origin translates into a much smaller swing supply from production. In Figure 6 
we use the average swing ratio of production from 1995-2005 to derive the 
(maximum) swing supply from production in 2030. 
 
Figure 6: Swing Supply from Production 2030 
Gas Supply 2030




(1) (2) (1) x (2)
TWh Ratio TWh
NWE 704 0,23 159
Norway 863 0,10 84
Russia and ex-CIS 1.305 0,03 43
Middle East 216 0,05 11
Africa 646 0,05 32
Total 3.733 328  
Source: Gas Supply 2030, based on the EU forecast and the supply split by Bothe 
and Seeliger 2005; own calculations for swing supply. 
Comparing the values of Table 2 and Table 1 shows that at least 905 TWh of 
swing will have to be provided by storage in 2030. Compared to similar 
calculations for our base year 2005 (resulting in a storage demand of 25.1 BCM), 
this implies an additional storage demand of 14.2 BCM in WGV.
13 
Adjustments 
So far we have assumed that the swing capability of endogenous production, as 
well as of imports remains, constant over time. This is clearly unrealistic for both 
sources of swing. 
For example, for the Dutch production, we have assumed a constant swing 
capability, although the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (2005, 11) assumes 
that, by 2030, “the reservoir pressure will no longer be high enough for the 
[Groningen] field to act as a swing supplier”. The reason for the reduced swing 
capability is the reduction in pressure due to the depletion of the gas fields. 
Though, technically, swing can still be produced, it becomes increasingly 
expensive, since the natural pressure has to be substituted by technological 
equipment. We therefore assume a reduction of the swing ratio of 50 per cent for 
all indigenous gas production in NWE. 
A similar argument applies to gas imports, which, as Figure 6 shows, also 
provide some swing. However, in the future, gas will come from far more distant 
                                                           
13 We calculate at 1 BCM = 11.5 TWh. This makes the additional assumption that all 
storage that is currently run as L-gas (low caloric gas) is transformed to H-gas (high caloric 
gas) storage. Note that, since we have defined swing as the difference between summer and 
winter consumption, one unit of storage can provide two units of swing: one is filled in the 
summer, which is then released in the winter; thus we have 1 – (-1) = 2 as the swing supply 
from one unit of storage.   13
fields in Russia or Norway, which reduces the swing capability of these sources. 
Again, we assume a reduction of 50 per cent by the year 2030 for this source of 
swing.
14 
These assumptions lead to a far more realistic outcome which, for further 
reference, we will call “Adjusted Scenario”. 
Security of Supply 
Due to the increasing dependence on imports from distant fields, supply 
interruptions are becoming an increasingly important issue for NWE. Supply 
interruptions may be due to technical problems, but also to terrorist attacks, or 
there may be political reasons for them. 
The supply interruptions (of oil and gas) due to conflicts between Russia and 
Belarus (in Winter 2006/07) as well as between Russia and Ukraine (Winter 
2005/06), have increased the sensitivity of the EU and its member countries to this 
issue. During the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine in the winter of 
2005/2006, gas deliveries to western Europe at times dropped by one-third.
15 This 
might revive plans in the European Union to oblige member states to hold strategic 
gas stocks (European Commission 2004, 68). Currently, no such obligation exists 
on the European level. However, some member countries actively address this 
issue. In Italy, gas suppliers have to hold 10 per cent of their imports from non-EU 
countries as strategic reserves. Such obligations block storage facilities used for the 
normal swing provision. Spain forces importers to diversify their portfolios such 
that no import company receives more than 60 per cent from one source. 
However, none of the countries in NWE has such an obligation in place. Where 
storage obligations exist, they are meant as a compulsory buffer against extreme 
weather conditions. Sources of supply do not matter.
16 
In our forecast model, any such obligation would come on top of the storage 
demand we have so far calculated. Strategic stock blocks storage capacities meant 
for operational use, that is, those meant to meet the calculated seasonal swing 
demand. The strategic stock must be available in particular in the winter, when the 
vulnerability of the import countries is largest. We calculate a strategic stock at 5 
per cent of the non-EU imports, excluding Norway (i.e. Norwegian imports are 
treated as exempted from storage obligations). 
Figure 7 summarizes the results. It highlights that adjusted assumption on the 
swing capability of imports and indigenous production increase the storage demand 
from 14.2 BCM to 21.3 BCM. Taking a 5 per cent buffer for non-EU imports into 
account on top of that, a realistic forecast of the additional demand for storage is of 
                                                           
14 A similar assumption is made in CIEP (2006), p. 12. 
15 Press release, Austrian Ministry of Economic Affairs, 5 January 2006. In an interview 
with German television ARD on January 5, 2006, the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Martenstein, mentioned that at some points in time deliveries where only half the usual 
volume. 
16 Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the UK have such obligations, usually 
requiring gas suppliers to be able to supply under the hardest weather conditions in the last 
50 years. For Germany, no such obligation exists. See IEA (2004, b), p. 345-346.   14
the order of 31 BCM, equivalent to 75 per cent of the currently installed WGV in 
NWE. 

















Extrapolation Extrapolation: Security of Supply
Adjustments Adjustments: Security of Supply
 
Excess Capacities in 2005 
The calculated additional storage demand would require additional storages to 
be built only if all facilities were used up to capacity in the base year 2005. This, 
however, is not clear. 
It has been frequently observed that only a relatively small fraction of the WGV 
is, on average, actually used. CIEP (2006, p. 9) reports average utilization rates of 
between 40 and 70 per cent over the last 20 years, though with a clear tendency 
towards increased usage. 
In Germany, the largest storage provider in NWE, in the period from 1994/95-
2004/05, only about 50 per cent of storage was utilized. Part of the underutilization 
might be due to the fact that storage has been built for future purposes; this might 
be reflected in the fact that roughly 20 per cent of the WGV has not even been 
filled with gas. Usually it takes a couple of years before a underground storage is 
fully filled for the first time. However, even of the gas filled during the summer, 40 
per cent has not been used.
 17 
One obvious explanation for the low utilization rates observed is the need to 
hold stocks for extreme weather conditions. It is in general difficult to derive how 
much additional storage is necessary to meet extreme weather conditions, e.g., the 
coldest winter in the last 50 years. Even in the very cold winter 1995/96 (compare 
                                                           
17 These calculations are based on data by the German authorities “Niedersächsisches 
Landesamt für Bodenforschung (NLfB)”, http://www.nlfb.de.   15
Figure 4), the utilization rate in Germany was only at 66 per cent.
18 According to 
CIEP (2006) it was slightly above 60 per cent in the whole of Europe. 
The opposite extreme to assuming no excess capacities in 2005 would be to 
assume that all capacity that was not actually used in 2005 is excess capacity (this 
would be equivalent to assuming that gas suppliers do not take additional 
provisions for extreme weather conditions, compared to our base period 1995/96 to 
2004/05). 
Between the two extremes, we take the middle road. A buffer of the order of 40 
per cent of the installed WGV for extreme weather conditions seems rather high; 
since we do not want to exaggerate the “storage gap”, and since some of the rather 
new storages might not yet be filled up to full capacity, we will assume some level 
of “idle capacity” in the base period. We will assume idle capacity of 20 per cent of 
the installed WGV for 2005 (equivalent to 8.1 BCM). This is a rather conservative 
assumption; that is, it does not exaggerate the storage gap.
19 
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In Figure 8 we depict the results for the actual “storage gap” (negative values 
reflect an excess supply). As has already been shown, when assuming no idle 
capacities in 2005, our adjusted extrapolation yields a storage gap of 21.3 BCM by 
                                                           
18 Storages were, however, virtually empty on March 31, 1996. The reason for this was not 
only the hard winter but also the fact that the fill level at the beginning of the winter was 
unusually low (66 per cent on September 30, 1995, compared to a long-term average of 
about 80 per cent). 
19 Note that there could be also other reasons for the “idle capacity”. Our simplified 
approach treats storages as being available for demand in the whole region, independent of 
the location of the storage. This is not realistic. Thus, additional storage has to be held due 
to uneven developments of storage supply and demand across NWE.   16
2030 (without accounting for strategic stock considerations). The opposite extreme, 
calculating all currently not used storages as “idle”, yields the opposite result: there 
will be an excess storage supply for almost every year until 2030. Our middle-of-
the-road estimates forecast a gap of 10.2 BCM by 2030. Storages would become 
scarce only after 2015. 
If we take the middle road as a realistic scenario, we can calculate the effect of 
strategic stock obligations for this case. The results are shown in Figure 9. An 
obligation to stock 5 per cent of imports from Russia, CIS, Africa, and the Rest of 
the World (but not from Norway) would almost double the storage gap by 2030. It 
would require an addition of 50 per cent of the currently installed WGV in NWE. 
Storage would be a scarce resource, even short-term, by 2010. Higher stock 
obligations, like 10 per cent, obviously make the problem of shortage in WGV 
even more pronounced. 
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5.  Discussion 
Figure 9 conveys two main insights. First, in the absence of severe supply 
interruptions, the existing and planned storage is sufficient to cover mid-term 
flexibility requirements, even if the supply structure changes to incorporate more 
distant sources. Second, if special provision is desired for considerations of supply 
security, facilities will not be sufficient in the near-term. Since it usually takes five 
to ten year to compete storage projects,
20 projects aiming to develop new facilities 
need to be started rather soon. 
                                                           
20 See, for example, IGU, Report of Working Committee 2 “Underground Storage” at the 
22
nd World Gas Conference, Tokyo, 2003, p. 118.   17
In our analysis, we have left out numerous additional effects. Here we want to 
discuss some of the most import ones. 
Gas demand structure There is considerable uncertainty about the extent to 
which the structure of gas demand will change due to an increase of gas-to-power. 
Although electricity demand can also show some seasonal cyclicality, increased 
usage for gas-to-power is likely to decrease the (relative) demand for seasonal 
swing. We have accounted for this by using the growth rates of the final energy 
consumption for our forecast (which exclude the use of gas for electricity 
production). However, for the whole forecast period, the figures for final energy 
consumption do not differ significantly from the forecasts for the total energy 
supply of gas (the latter is even slightly smaller at 0.3 per cent p.a. for the period 
2005 to 2030 in the EU forecast for NWE).
21 Thus, projected changes in the gas 
demand structure are relatively small, and therefore our results are unlikely to be 
affected by this. 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) Nearly all countries in NWE are trying to diversify 
their import portfolio via imports of LNG. LNG is often used as an instrument to 
supply short-term flexibility (“LNG peak shaving”), and it might, in principle, also 
be used to supply seasonal swing. However, NWE competes for LNG in the 
Atlantic Basin with North America, i.e. with a large demand that shows similar 
seasonal demand patterns. Thus, LNG will probably remain a relatively expensive 
form of swing supply. 
Liberalization Natural gas markets will probably be subject to significant 
changes in the next decades due to the ongoing liberalization. Strategic 
considerations will become more important. The fact that storage access is 
regulated already indicates that storage might not be a competitive market, as it is 
implicitly treated in our model. Storage operators, in particular if they are part of an 
integrated gas company, might try to withhold capacity from the market. Thus, it 
may be that not all physically available capacity will actually be available. 
Therefore, our forecast tends to underestimate actual shortages in the markets. 
Withdrawal capacity Throughout the paper, we have only considered the mere 
size of the storage. However, another important precondition for the provision of 
flexibility is the withdrawal capacity, i.e. the ability to quickly release and fill the 
storage units. This can impose additional restrictions on the capability to quickly 
enough meet demand in the winter, and it is likely to cause additional requirements 
for storage. 
Gas quality Currently, in NWE, in particular in the Netherlands and Germany, 
two gas qualities are in use, H-gas and L-gas. Although L-gas will probably fade 
out by 2030, at least in the transition period, flexibility for both gas qualities must 
be available. This could increase the demand for storage within the transition 
period. 
                                                           
21 The IEA forecasts are slightly different, but not in terms of order of magnitude. For NWE 
without UK (no forecasts are available for UK for the year 2030 from IEA), final 
consumption is projected to grow at 0.6 per cent p.a. versus total energy supply by 1.1 per 
cent p.a.   18
Regional availability Although it makes sense to treat NWE as a single region, 
and although market integration will also make some progress in the market for gas 
storage, optimal positioning of storage will remain near the location of consumers. 
A storage site in northern Germany is of little immediate use to balance seasonal 
swing in southern France. Again, such considerations show that our figures tend to 
underestimate the storage gap. 
Market distortions in gas supply We used the data from Bothe and Seeliger 
(2005), who assume least cost provision, i.e. the competitive sourcing of natural 
gas. As they show, this has not been the case in the past. Relatively cheap 
indigenous production has been superseded by Russian gas, mainly for geo-
strategic reasons. The large pipeline project (“Nord Stream”) between Russia and 
Germany indicates that this bias might also be relevant for the future. This, again, 
would increase the storage gap, since even more gas would come from Russia, 
providing less swing than is calculated in our base line case. 
CO2 Storage There is a lively discussion about the extent to which underground 
storage facilities can be used for the long-term storage of CO2. Technologically, 
this seems to be possible (Shi and Durucan 2005), although it is not yet clear 
whether such storage of emissions would be considered equivalent to an avoidance 
of emissions (if it were, the storage value for such use would be equivalent to the 
avoided cost of CO2 allowances). This is potentially an additional, competing 
demand for WGV. 
Therefore, accounting for these additional, but difficult to quantify aspects 
would tend to even increase the storage gap. Our calculations hence are to be 
understood as a lower bound for the storage gap. 
6.  Conclusion 
Seasonality in gas demand requires flexibility in the supply of gas. In NWE, 
flexible indigenous production has to be replaced by less flexible imports from far 
distant fields. The additional flexibility has to be provided by gas storage facilities. 
While this will cause few problems in midterm, beyond 2015/20, a significant 
storage gap will arise. We project the gap to increase to about 10 BCM WGV by 
2030, even without strategic stock obligations. With such obligations, the gap will 
increases to 20 (5 per cent of non-EU imports) or almost 30 BCM WGV (10 per 
cent of non-EU imports). Although such forecasts are based on strong assumptions, 
the choice of assumptions is such that this is likely to be a lower bound for the 
storage gap. 
Thus, the question arises: How can the gap be closed? Although underground 
storage requires certain geological conditions, and therefore such facilities cannot 
arbitrarily be increased, the geology in NWE will probably not be a limiting factor. 
With the UK perhaps being an exemption, NWE has various places still suitable for 
salt caverns, and an obvious opportunity is to use the depleted gas fields. The 
question is rather the cost of building new storages (e.g., offshore gas fields could 
be turned into gas storage facilities, though at much higher cost than onshore fields 
or salt caverns) and the economic incentive to do so.   19
Market solutions for the “operational” storage gap 
The storage gap stemming from the need to provide seasonal swing could 
probably largely be closed by a market mechanism. Our forecast method did not 
account for any price adjustments, although these are likely. Storage becomes 
scarce and hence prices will go up; this, in turn, increases incentives to invest in 
storage (or into alternative sources of swing, or to reduce the seasonality of swing 
demand). The time horizon – a gap not earlier than 2010/15 – also allows a timely 
reaction. 
This requires well functioning markets for flexibility, in particular a well 
functioning market for storage services. Although the storage business requires 
high sunk costs, it does not seem to be a natural monopoly. The high number of 
different operators in Germany (i.e. 14 companies) indicates this. Private 
investment incentives might nevertheless be adversely affected by the regulation of 
storage. 
Access to storage is regulated since it serves similar purposes to the balancing 
of energy in electricity markets: Market entry without access to flexibility is very 
difficult. Thus, in order to open the gas market to competition, it is very important 
to ensure access to storage for entrants. 
In Article 19 of its Gas Directive, the European Union (2003) therefore has 
established third-party access (TPA) to storage in order to facilitate downstream 
competition in the gas market. While the Gas Directive also allows for regulated 
TPA, all member countries so far have opted for the alternative, namely, negotiated 
TPA. Regulators have coordinated to recommend that the focus should be on the 
obligation to provide access on non-discriminatory terms and with transparency 
about tariff methodologies (ERGEG 2004). 
Although this regulation is rather light-handed, it limits the storage operator’s 
control rights and therefore reduces future profits and consequently incentives to 
invest in storage facilities. The European Union has accounted for this: the Gas 
Directive in Article 22 allows for the exemption of new storage facilities from TPA 
regulation under the condition that “the investment must enhance competition in 
gas supply and enhance security of supply”. Given the predicted future scarcity of 
storage amounts, such an exemption seems to make sense. However, it highlights 
that there is a trade-off between establishing short-term competition in the 
downstream market and investment incentives in storage facilities.
22 
Another issue related to the liberalization of gas markets is the integration of 
storages in the transport system. Due to the industry history, storages and networks 
are often part of the same fully integrated gas company in NWE. Thus, unfavorable 
conditions for transport to and from storages can serve the same purposes as 
unfavorable conditions for storage usage. Thus, it is important to (i) establish 
competition-friendly conditions for the integration of storage in the transport 
                                                           
22 One could even argue that abandoning storage TPA is required, since even if new 
facilities are exempted, their return on investment is depressed if TPA reduces the market 
price. This, however, would probably be detrimental to opening the gas market to 
competition.   20
system, (ii) avoid overpriced transport fees as such, and (iii) enforce effective 
unbundling of storage operations from transport operations.
23 
Solutions for the “strategic” storage gap 
How could strategic stock be supplied? The additional volume is probably too 
high to allow us to expect that sufficient storage could be made available near-
term. Furthermore, the organization of the storage market is more controversial in 
this case. The lowest level of state intervention would consist of imposing storage 
obligations on import companies – and it would leave the rest to the market. This 
would put storage operators in a favorable position and probably generate, at least 
short-term, large windfall profits. Long term, however, high price levels for storage 
would attract additional entrants into the storage market, and it would create high 
incentives to substitute gas from source with storage obligations with sources 
without such obligations (or incentives to switch to other fuels). 
An alternative system, practiced, for example, by Spain, is to essentially split 
the market into a regulated and an unregulated segment.
24 In Spain, each gas 
company has a storage obligation. The transmission system operator, also 
responsible for the organization of storage, allocates available storage volumes to 
the companies, which have to pay regulated fees for the storage. These fees cover 
the variable cost of storage. The fixed costs are reimbursed separately at regulated 
conditions. This is similar to the practice with regard to strategic oil reserves. 
Such a system prevents the gas companies from a “cost shock” and the resulting 
windfall profits for the storage owners. It requires a certain degree of centralization 
(e.g., with a transmission system operator) and ongoing regulatory intervention. 
Furthermore, it raises questions with regard to the relation between the regulated 
and the unregulated part of the market. Typically, it will not be the case the whole 
sites are either dedicated to strategic storage or to commercial storage. Rather, 
facilities will be virtually split into an unregulated and a regulated part. This raises 
the question how to allocate cost between the two if, e.g., the tariff for the 
regulated part is regulated at a cost plus basis, while the unregulated part is subject 
only to a negotiated third party access regime. 
Further question are: Can capacities on the unregulated market substitute for 
covering strategic reserve obligations? Can operators in the regulated market also 
make offers in the unregulated market? Are operators on the regulated market 
guaranteed full utilization of their capacities? If so, does the regulated tariff act as a 
lower bound for the unregulated part of the market? Can storages of other EU 
countries be used to satisfy storage obligations? 
Furthermore, a drawback of regulation is the danger that a part of the cost of 
storage will be socialized among all system users. Thus, private incentives to 
                                                           
23 In particular the latter can be seen as a shortcoming of current EU legislation, which 
requires neither legal nor ownership unbundling for storage operations but only accounting 
separation; see EU Directive 2003/55/EC (26. June 2003), Art. 17 no. 3. 
24 See the First Final Disposition of Royal Decree 1716/2004 (July 23
rd, 2004). For the 
actual operation of the system, see the System Operator Enagas’ annual report 2006 on gas 
movements, p. 47-54, downloadable under http://www.enagas.es.   21
reduce exposure to supply sources with strategic reserve obligations are biased 
downwards. 
Strategic storage obligations will probably require state intervention beyond the 
mere imposition of storage quotas. Such intervention has to carefully balance the 
effects between the regulated (strategic stock) part of the market and the 
unregulated market for flexibility. 
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Appendix 
Figure 10: Swing Ratios 
Average Maximum Stand. dev. Average Stand. dev.
Belgium 0,25 0,31 0,03 - -
Denmark 0,28 0,31 0,02 0,15 0,06
France 0,41 0,46 0,03 0,04 0,07
Germany 0,31 0,35 0,02 0,17 0,05
Netherlands 0,28 0,31 0,02 0,36 0,05
Switzerland 0,40 0,44 0,03 - -
UK 0,24 0,26 0,02 0,16 0,04
Norway - - - 0,10 0,07
Russia and ex-CIS - - - 0,03 0,04
Middle East - - - 0,05 0,06
Africa - - - 0,05 0,06
Swing Demand Swing Supply
 
Swing ratios are defined as: sum of winter quantities – sum of summer quantities, where summer = April to September, 
and winter = October to March. Belgium and Switzerland do not have indigenous production. 
The value for “Africa” equals the value for Algeria, the only African country with exports to NWE for the whole period 
1995—2004. Since all other imports are far more distant, this tends to overestimate the swing capability of African 
imports. 
For the Middle East, no country has imported for more than five years in the period 1995—2004. Thus, we approximate 
the Middle East value by the values of Russia. 
 
 
Figure 11: Details Adjusted Scenario 
1. Adjusted Scenario without Strategic Stock
Storage Gap 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Assuming no excess 
capacity in 2005
BCM 0,0 5,4 10,0 13,3 17,0 21,3
Assuming 20% excess 
capacity
BCM -7,2 -3,8 -1,2 2,2 5,8 10,2
Assuming unused capacity = 
excess capacity
BCM -15,3 -11,9 -9,3 -5,9 -2,3 2,1
2. Adjusted Scenario with 5% Strategic Stock
Storage Gap 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Assuming no excess 
capacity in 2005
BCM 3,4 10,3 16,0 19,6 24,2 30,7
Assuming 20% excess 
capacity
BCM -3,8 1,1 4,8 8,5 13,0 19,6
Assuming unused capacity = 
excess capacity
BCM -11,9 -7,0 -3,3 0,4 4,9 11,5
3. Adjusted Scenario with 10% Strategic Stock
Storage Gap 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Assuming no excess 
capacity in 2005
BCM 6,8 15,2 21,9 25,9 31,3 40,2
Assuming 20% excess 
capacity
BCM -0,5 6,0 10,8 14,8 20,2 29,0
Assuming unused capacity = 
excess capacity
BCM -8,6 -2,1 2,7 6,7 12,1 20,9
 